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VERTICAL INTEGRATION AS A RESTRAINT ON
INTRABRAND COMPETITION: THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
I NrRODUCTION
In Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,' plaintiff Coleman Motor
Company, a former independently franchised dealer of Dodge au-
tomobiles and trucks, brought a treble damage action under section 4
of the Clayton Act3
 against Chrysler Corporation, alleging violations
of section 1 3 and 24
 of the Sherman Act. 5
 Plaintiff alleged that as a
result of various instances of preferential treatment by Chrysler to-
wards its partially and wholly owned dealerships (hereinafter "factory
dealers" or "factory dealerships") he was forced to surrender his
franchise and to cease operations. 8
 Plaintiff further alleged that such
preferential treatment was the product of a conspiracy between
Chrysler and its factory dealers which had the effect of destroying in-
dependent Dodge dealers.'
Prior to 1954, Chrysler marketed its vehicles through a tradi-
tional form of franchise agreement, the independent franchise
dealership. 8
 In 1955, plaintiff became an independent franchise
Dodge dealer in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. 8 Under the fran-
chise agreement, plaintiff bought Dodge vehicles directly from
Chrysler and agreed to sell a minimum quantity of those vehicles. The
agreement also provided that the franchise could be terminated by
Coleman on 30 days notice and by Chrysler upon breach by
Coleman.'°
At about the same time that Coleman became a dealer, Chrysler
began to franchise dealers under a new plan whereby Chrysler would
supply up to 75 percent of the capital necessary for a franchisee to
open a new dealership." Under the plan, the 25 percent private
owner could ultimately purchase Chrysler's 75 percent interest in the
dealership. Until the private owner did so, however, Chrysler retained
majority control as a shareholder and as a member of the board of
directors." In 1961, the first factory dealership in Allegheny County,
1 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975).
3 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
3 15 U.S.C.	 I (1970). Section 1 provides in pertinent part; "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce ... is declared to be illegal ...."
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Section 2 provides in pertinent part; "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-
son or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce ... shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor ...."





" Id. Plaintiff stipulated at trial that the manner in which Chrysler calculated the
annual minimum quantity was fair and reasonable. Id.
"
"1d. Before the first dealership opened under the new plan, Chrysler's total na-
tional market penetration dropped from approximately 20% to 10.8%. Id.
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Boulevard Dodge, opened." Before the establishment of Boulevard,
Coleman had suffered a total loss of approximately $74,000 and had
operated at a profit in only one year from 1955 to 1961. 14 After
Boulevard's first year, Coleman lost $16,799 15 and its share of Dodge
sales in Allegheny County dropped from 14.2 percent to 7.4
percent." However, during the period from 1963 to 1965, Coleman
made a $12,380 profit."
By 1966, when another factory dealership, Monroeville Dodge,
opened, there were six factory dealers in Allegheny County." When
the factory dealer programs began to operate, Chrysler sales in Al-
legheny County increased from 11.28 percent to 18.01 percent of the
total automobile market and actual Dodge sales in the county in-
creased from 3117 to 6033.' 2 However, after Monroeville opened,
plaintiff's share of sales decreased from approximately 5 percent to
3.8 percent. 2 ° By 1967, the factory dealers had cornered 54.2 percent
of the Dodge, market in Allegheny County. 2 ' Coleman lost $4,070
during the first year of the Monroeville dealership and continued to
lose money until it closed in 1969. 22 During the period from 1961 to
1968, the number of independent dealers decreased from 15 to 11.
From 1961 to 1966, the number of factory dealerships grew to six. By
1968, however, that number had declined to four."
The gist of plaintiff's complaint was that Chrysler operated its
factory dealerships without regard for profit at the retail level in a
manner designed to increase overall Dodge sales at the manufacturer
level. 24 The precise question, as the court of appeals viewed it, is
whether a "reduction in intrabrand competition bra tendency toward
a vertically integrated distribution system" 25 is "sufficient to establish
an unreasonable restraint of trade under section one of the Sherman
Act." 26
' 3 /d. at 1342. Despite Chrysler's institution of the new franchising plan, it con-
tinued to experience a declining trend in market penetration. To counter this trend,
Chrysler inaugurated another new program to encourage new franchises in 1964.
Under the 1964 program, Chrysler would lend a potential franchisee up to one-half of
the capital needed to purchase a 25% interest in a Dodge dealership. Id. at 1341.
' 4 Id. at 1343.
" Id.
" Id. at 1342.
" Id. at 1343.
"Id, at 1342.
"Id. Chrysler's national market penetration also improved, and by 1968
Chrysler's national market penetration had increased to 16.25%, with Dodge sales in-
creasing from 3.43% to 6.18%. Id.
20 1d.
" Id.
" Id. at 1343.
23 1d. at 1342.
24 1d. at 1343.
"Id. at 1346. A vertically integrated distribution system is one in which a firm
acquires control of its own distributive outlets.
=0
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The Coleman court's finding that an unreasonable restraint of
trade followed from Chrysler's alleged attempt to control the retail
distribution of Dodge vehicles in Allegheny County provides a possi-
ble precedent through which more effective competition in the au-
tomobile industry can be promoted. Such a result can be reached by
focusing on the effect of eliminating independent dealers such .
 as Cole-
man on the competition in the intrabrand market rather than on the
competitive situation which exists in the interbrand markets' Thus, the
case can be viewed as establishing a precedent that may be utilized for
the purpose of preserving the only effective competition—that of in-
trabrand competition—which can exist in the relatively anticompeti-
tive oligopolistic automobile industry. 23
Plaintiff specifically complained of three practices undertaken by
Chrysler. First, Chrysler provided its factory dealers with the initial
capital required to open a dealership. Second, Chrysler provided sub-
stantial operating loss subsidies which enabled the factory dealers to
have bigger and more attractive showrooms, and to spend more
money on advertising than the independent dealers. Third, Chrysler
provided its factory dealers with the services of managerial employees
at no expense to the dealers." In addition, plaintiff averred that
Chrysler intended to accomplish its design by squeezing independent
dealers out of the market and by establishing a sales structure consist-
ing of 'several large Chrysler owned dealerships. 3 °
After trial in federal district court, the jury returned a verdict in
which it found that "the defendants engage[d] in [a] combination or
conspiracy ... which unreasonably restrained interstate trade or
commerce in Dodge vehicles at the retail level in Allegheny County." 3 '
In addition, the jury determined that by reason of such combination
or conspiracy, plaintiff had suffered $300,000 in damages. The dis-
' 7
 the intrabrand market is the market comprised of sales of the same
manufacturer's goods, whereas the interbrand market encompasses the sales of the
goods of different manufacturers.
28
 See text at notes 43-68 infra.
"Id. at 1341-42.
30 1d. at 1343. The complaint in Coleman alleged that the illegal restraint of trade
occurred in the Dodge market in Allegheny County, thereby raising the issue of what
constituted the relevant product market for the facts presented in the case. Id. at 1340.
The issue is important to a finding of a § 2 violation since whether monopolization has
occurred or been attempted depends on what segment of the market is being consid-
ered. The defendant contended that all automobiles reasonably interchangeable with
Dodges constituted the relevant product market. The district court judge originally in-
structed the jury that the relevant product market was Dodge vehicles. However, upon
Chrysler's objection, the judge submitted the relevant product market issue to the jury.
The jury did not return a special interrogatory on the issue, but did phrase the inter-
rogatories on the issue of liability in terms of a market consisting only of Dodges. Id. at
1343 n.8. The court of appeals considered the absence of a specific finding important
to the § 2 claim and thus, remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1349. However, with respect
to intrabrand competition, only the effects on the Dodge market itself are pertinent.
3 ' Id. at 1340.
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trict court entered judgment against Chrysler and awarded plaintiff
treble damages in the amount of $900,000. The court also de-
nied Chrysler's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
a new tria1. 32
Chrysler appealed both the factual and legal issues to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, asserting that the rec-
ord contained insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, 33 that
certain evidence should have been excluded," and that the jury was
improperly instructed." The court of appeals vacated the judgment
and remanded to the district court for a new tria1 36 on the grounds
that (1) the evidence of a prior verdict against Chrysler in a similar
case was erroneously admitted; 37 (2) the critical product market issue
relevant to the section 2 claim had been presented to the jury in a
confusing manner;" and (3) the testimony offered on the issue of
damages was too speculative to sustain the award of treble damages. 39
More importantly, however, with respect to the merits of plaintiff's
section 1 claim, the court of appeals concluded that on the evidence
presented, the jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant
combined and conspired with factory dealers." As a matter of law, the
court HELD: A manufacturer who subsidizes its partially and wholly
owned dealers in a manner that places independent dealers at a sub-
stantial competitive disadvantage can be found to have unreasonably
restrained trade" in contravention of section I of the Sherman Act."
32 Id. at 1340-41.
"Id. at 1341.
34 Id. Defendant asserted that while it was proper to introduce into evidence
another case against Chrysler in which the allegations were identical to those in
Coleman, Mt. Lehanon Motors. Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa.
1968), affd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969), in order to show bias on the part of
a witness for Coleman who had been the plaintiff in Mt. Lebanon, plaintiffs reference to
the verdict against Chrysler in that case on redirect, in examination of a second witness,
and in closing argument was improper and unduly prejudicial. 525 F.2d at 1350-51.
35 525 F.2d at 1341.
"Id. at 1354.
32 1d. at 1351.
"id. at 1349.
39 Id. at 1353.
40 Id. at 1345.
Although in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897), the Supreme Court originally construed the "restraint of trade" language of 1) 1
to mean every restraint of trade, id. at 312, the Court later developed the "rule of
reason" in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-65 (1911). By adopting the
"rule of reason," the Court reinterpreted 1 to mean that only those restraints which
were unreasonable were prohibited. It should be noted that the "rule of reason" need
not be specifically applied in each case as there are some types of restraints which the
Court has determined to be unreasonable as a matter of law and which, therefore, are
illegal per se. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 5 (1458).
42
 525 F.2d at 1345-46. Although plaintiff also alleged that defendant had at-
tempted to monopolize trade in Dodge vehicles at the retail level in Allegheny County
and the jury had found for plaintiffs on this § 2 claim as well as on the 1 claim, id. at
1340, this comment will not discuss the § 2 finding. The court of appeals found that
with respect to the relevant product market for the § 2 claim the record was confused.
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This comment will generally consider the validity of the conclu-
sion that a tendency towards vertical integration in distribution can be
an unreasonable restraint of trade under section I of the Sherman
Act. More particularly, the comment will first examine the anti-
competitive nature of the oligopolistic automobile industry and the in-
ability of the antitrust laws as presently interpreted to counter the ef-
fects of anticompetitive behavior at the manufacturer level. Next, the
possibility of insuring the existence of some competition in the indus-
try by protecting competition at the retail level will be examined. In
this context, the developing case law with regard to franchise termina-
tions and vertical boycotts will be evaluated. The comment will then
examine recent cases to determine what factors are relevant to a find-
ing of a restraint of trade at the retail level. Finally, the relevance of
an allegation of increased competition in the interbrand market to a
finding of restraint of trade in the intrabrand market will be
evaluated.
I. THE OLIGOPOLIST1C NATURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
The adverse effect on competition resulting from the elimination
of independent franchise dealers like Coleman can be exemplified by
an analysis of the present structure of the automobile industry. Three
automobile manufacturers-the Big Three-account for approxi-
mately 97 percent of the sales of domestic automobiles. 43 It has been
suggested that the only long-term justification for such high concen-
Id. at 1349. Therefore, the Third Circuit declined to enter judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and remanded for a new trial the issue of liability under 11 2. Id.
4 ' STANDARD & POOR, INDUSTRY SURVEYS: AUTOS-BASIC ANALYSIS A139 (August 7,
1975). The market shares in 1974 were General Motors-49.8%; Ford-29.6%;
Chrysler-16.1%. American Motors accounted for 4.5% with Checker Motors taking up
the remaining 0.1%.
Between 1962 and 1968, the Big Three's share of the new car market in Al-
legheny County ranged from a high of 89.54% in 1966 to a low of 86.94% in 1968. 525
F.2d at 1342. The actual breakdown of the new passenger automobile registrations in
Allegheny County was as follows:








1962 53.01 25.39 11.28 4.94 6.71 5.61
1963 51.42 22.07 13.96 6.47 .6.84 5.71
1964 49.49 24.22 14.25 6.63 5.88 6.16
1965 51:86 22.15 15.26 6.56 4.32 6.41
1966 49.01 24.01 16.52 7.28 3.45 7.01
1967 50.50 20.73 17.60 7.51 2.87 8.30
1968 47.56 21.37 18.01 7.19 2.98 10.08
Id. The average aggregate share during the seven year period was 88.24%. In 1962, the
year after the first factory dealership opened, Chrysler's share of the Allegheny market
was 11.28%, and in 1968, the year before the Coleman dealership closed, Chrysler's
share was 18.01%.
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tration is scale economies." A scale economy focuses on the smallest
share of the total market which a firm can have and still realize the
lowest possible per-unit costs. Thus, if a single firm must have a rela-
tively large share of a market in order to realize the lowest per-unit
costs and thereby sell at a lower consumer price, there is justification
for concentration. 45 Therefore, while a certain amount of concentra-
tion may be necessary to foster economic efficiency and progress, it
has become increasingly clear that the Big Three have reached a level
of concentration exceeding that which is required for optimum
efficiency." Such excessive concentration is increasingly being re-
garded as harmful, rather than helpful, to competition. The Supreme
Court,'" Congress,'" and commentators" have each indicated an aware-
ness of the anticompetitive effects of high concentration. Although a
high degree of concentration may represent the entirely fortuitous
position of firms that have survived in a declining industry, 50 it is
more likely to result from deliberate business conduct designed for
that purpose." An example of a situation in which high concentration
may be the result of such deliberate business conduct is an oligopoly.
An oligopoly, which is broadly defined as a market controlled by
a few manufacturers who impose high barriers to the entry of new
competitors," is generally the result of intentional business conduct
rather than purely fortuitous events. 53 While it is assumed that a pure
" Sherman & Tollison, Public Policy Toward Oligopoly: Dissolution and Scale
Economies, 4 ANTITRUST LAW & EcoN. REV. 77, 78 (Summer, 1971).
" See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).
4° Sca le economy data with respect to the automobile industry indicates that all
economies of scale in production are exhausted in a plant producing 7.5% of the total
United States market. However, the four largest firms have on the average a market
share of 22.55%. The implication is that concentration in the automobile industry is 3
times as large as it needs to be to achieve optimum efficiency. See J. BAIN—supra note 45,
at 84.
47 See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 554-55
(1971); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 366 (1970);
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577-80 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 597-99 (1965); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377
U.S. 271, 277-81 (1964).
19 See, e.g., Hearings on Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations Before the Antitrust.
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 23, pt. 1-7
(1969-70); Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7 (1968).
49 See, e.g., Kozik, Oligopoly and the Concept of Workable or Effective Competition: 411
Economic Analysis of Recent Antitrust Cases, 21 U. PITT. L. REV. 621, 622-26 (1960); Muel-
ler, The Nero Antitrust: A "Structural" Approach, 1 ANTITRUST LAW & EcoN. Rev. 87, 89-91,
98 (Winter, 1967).
"See R. NELSON, CONCENTRATION IN THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF THE
UNITED STATES 3 (1963).
" Id.
52 See, e.g., Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 865 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974).
52 Glossary, 1 ANTITRUST LAW & EcoN. REV. 129, 138 (July-August, 1967). For a
background of oligopoly theory see, e.g., J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed.
1968); R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT: PERFORMANCE (2d ed.
1967).
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oligopoly does not exist, a distinction has been drawn between "tight"
and "loose" oligopolies which, although not pure, behave in an
oligopolistic fashion. "Tight" oligopolies (concentration of more than
50 percent of sales in four or fewer firms") are defined as conform-
ing to the mode1,55
 while "loose" oligopolies contain an unconcen-
trated segment which may or may not impose a competitive restraint
on the concentrated firms." The automobile industry is a classic il-
lustration of a "tight" oligopoly. As noted above, three firms supply
approximately 97 percent of the industry's domestic production."
Furthermore, barriers to entry into the industry are extremely high.
The scale economy required to survive in the automobile industry
creates one of the most formidable disadvantages for new entrants of
any industry in the United States." In fact, not one new domestic au-
tomobile manufacturer has entered the industry since 1923. 59
The high degree of concentration that characterizes an oligopoly
such as the automobile industry serves to destroy any actual competi-
tion among the few firms which comprise the oligopoly. High market
concentration and entry barriers foster price fixing and other types of
interdependent behavior." Specifically, high concentration under-
mines independent decisions by the firms with respect to prices and
levels of production, thereby engendering a disregard for price and
product competition in favor of restricting production and inflated
prices.'" In order to retain such a controlled situation, the firms in the
oligopoly must maintain high entry barriers to effectively forestall the
possibility that the availability of new entrants' products will institute
competitive conditions."
Measured by reference to the factors of concentration and bar-
riers to entry, the automobile industry is one of the most anti-
competitive Industries in America; concentration is maintained at a
level which is twice that considered repugnant to competition." How-
ever, while the interdependent conduct of the Big Three has the same
anticompetitive effect as a conspiracy or combination, such conduct is
"See Mueller, supra note 49, at 116-17. There is some disagreement as to pre-
cisely what the level of concentration must be in order to constitute a "tight" oligopoly.
Compare C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
27 (1959), with Glossary, I ANTITRUST LAW & ECON. REV. 129, 138 (July-August, 1967).
However, in neither instance would a concentration of 50% in four or fewer firms not
be deemed a "tight" oligopoly.
" See J. BAN,supra note 53, at 117-18, 122-23.
"See id.
57 See note 43 supra.
" See J. RAIN, SUpra note 45, at 81, 127-29, 158-59.
" Snell, Annual Style Change in 'he Automobile Industry as an Unfair Method of Com-
petition, 4 ANTITRUST LAW & EcoN. REV. 67, 73 n.22 (Fall, 1970).
"See, e.g., Erickson, The Economics of Price Fixing, 2 ANTITRUST LAW & ECON. REV.
94, 101-09 (Spring, 1969); Mueller, supra note 49, at 90-91.
"See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 54, at 104-05; Mueller, supra note 49, at
114-16.
"See R. CAVES, supra note 53, at 22-23; Mueller, supra note 49, at 89 n.7.
53 See Mueller, supra note 49, at 115-16.
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effectively outside the scope of the antitrust laws. Those laws prohibit
only concerted behavior in "restraint of trade"" and behavior that
tends to "monopolize" trade. 65 The Big Three's behavior generally
does not involve concerted action. 66 Nor could it be viewed as
monopolizing trade since there is not a single monopoly firm but
three firms "collectively monopolizing." 87 Therefore, since there is no
evidence of a multi-firm conspiracy or a single-firm monopoly, the an-
ticompetitive activities of the Big Three fall into a gap in the statutory
scheme and cannot be reached directly by the antitrust laws as pres-
ently interpreted."
A number of proposals have been advanced with respect to the
manner in which the anticompetitive characteristics of the interbrand
automobile market could be reached and regulated." It has been
suggested that the Sherman Act "agreement" requirement be reinter-
preted to include interdependent action. 70 However, no antitrust deci-
sion has yet adopted the suggestion that the Sherman Act agreement
language be construed to include interdependent conscious paral-
lelism. 7 ' Another proposal involves considering the Big Three as a
multi-firm or "shared monopoly," bringing suit under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, and seeking an order requiring the manufacturers to
spin off a number of their divisions into independent
manufacturers. 72
 A third proposal which has particular significance
for purposes of this discussion is that suit be brought under the
Sherman Act to force the manufacturers to surrender their vertical
control of the automobile distribution system." The theory underly-
ing this third proposal is that an increase in the number of indepen-
dent dealers selling a particular brand of automobiles in a given geo-
graphical area will increase competition at the intrabrand retail level."
This third proposal involves direct affirmative action against the
manufacturers, insofar as it may force them to divest even though no
" See note 3 supra.
"See note 4 supra.
66 See J. BA1N,supra note 45, at 216; Mueller, supra note 49, at 112-16. Cl United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964).
67 See Mueller, supra note 49, at 114-15.
"See,	 R. JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION 110-11
(1970); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER. supra note 54, at 44.
6°
 See Oligopoly in the Automobile Industry, 4 ANTITRUST LAW & ECON. REV. 53, 53-56
(Fall, 1960).
7° See Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562, (1969); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Ad: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusal to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 677-84 (1962).
" Turner raised the possibility of such a construction by referring to the Su-
preme Court's language in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227
(1939). Turner, supra note 70, at 683. See A. NEALE:, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE.
U.S.A. 80-82 (1960).




 Id. at 55.
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predatory practices by the manufacturers against their dealers have
been established. Although the advisability of such affirmative action
is beyond the scope of this discussion, the theoretical justification for
such action would also justify a policy of forbidding a manufacturer
from utilizing predatory practices in order to achieve vertical integra-
tion of its distribution system before such integration exists. While
these three proposals have been offered as a means of increasing
competition in the automobile industry, to date, none have been
adopted by the courts. Therefore, at the moment, the possibility of
enforcing one of these proposals under the antitrust laws in order to
promote competition in the automobile industry is remote.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR INSURING COMPETITION IN THE AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY: COLEMAN AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Despite the courts' reluctance to adopt the proposed remedial
theories, recent developments in two areas of antitrust law—the ero-
sion of' the manufacturer's absolute right to structure his distribution
system in any manner he pleases, 75 and the precedent possibly set by
Coleman and a few other decisions; namely, that a violation of the
Sherman Act may occur when there is a restraint of trade in the in-
trabrand market 70 —suggest the possibility of preserving such compe-
tition as does exist in the automobile industry by insuring the pres-
ence of workable competition at the retail level. This end could be
accomplished by limiting a manufacturer's ability to vertically inte-
grate.
A. The Erosion of the Manufacturer's Absolute Right to Refuse to Deal
Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes "exclusive dealing" illegal."
Nevertheless, manufacturers have been able to accomplish the same
result by refusing to deal with some of their dealers even when an
agreement exists between the manufacturer and one of his other
dealers. 75 Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the pre-
" See text at notes 77-108 infra.
"See Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 869-70 (W.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 497 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974); Mt. Lebanon
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 457-59 (W.D. Pa. 1968), affd per
corking, 417 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1969).
" 15 U.S.C. 14 (1970). Section 3 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to lease or make a sale or contract
for sale ... on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee
or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, ... of a com-
petitor or competitors of the lessor or seller ... where the effect may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly ....
78 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376-78 (1967);
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp.,
460 F.2d 116, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1972); Ricchetti v. Meister Brau, Inc., 431 F.2d 1211,
1214 (9th Cir. 1970); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,' Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cm. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Schwing Motor Co.
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cise issue of whether a manufacturer has an absolute right to refuse to
supply and thereby terminate a dealer, numerous lower courts have
found such a right." One early decision, Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson
Sales Corp., 8 ° is illustrative of the reasoning advanced by the lower
courts on this issue. Schwing and another dealer of Hudson au-
tomobiles alleged that defendant Hudson had conspired with a third
dealer and, by failing to renew plaintiffs' dealership contracts, had at-
tempted to eliminate them as competitors of Hudson's co-
conspirator-dealer. 8 ' Schwing further alleged that Hudson and its
remaining dealer held a monopoly over the sale of Hudson au-
tomobiles in the relevant geographical market which resulted in
higher prices to the consuming public. 82 Without considering the pos-
sibility that an anticompetitive effect might exist, the court rejected
Schwing's arguments." The court concluded that (I) "[e]very man-
ufacturer has a natural and complete monopoly of his particular
product;"" (2) "he is free to exploit this monopoly by selling his prod-
uct directly to the ultimate consumer or through one or more dis-
tributors or dealers;" 85 and (3) his right to "exercise his own indepen-
dent discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal" has not been
destroyed by the antitrust laws." The court recognized that the estab-
lishment of an exclusive dealership necessarily gives a dealer a
monopoly of the manufacturer's products in a particular area thereby
permitting the dealer to dictate prices subject only to competition with
v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 902-03 (D. Md.), affd per cunam, 239 F.2d
176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
The origins of the concept that a manufacturer has a "right to refuse to deal" in
order to structure his distribution network, even to the point where the manufacturer is
in complete control of the entire distributive chain, can be found in the common law
freedom of contract doctrine. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 54
(1911). Thus, the concept precedes the enactment of the antitrust laws. Id. at 49-62.
The manufacturer's unfettered right to structure his distribution system . as he wishes
was firmly established as a defense to liability under the antitrust laws in 1919 in United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), where the Supreme Court concluded that
the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act]
does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal." Id. at 307.
rp See, e.g., Fedderson Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1950);
Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 902-03 (D. Md.), affd per
curiarn, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); Arthur v. Kraft-
Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824, 828-29 (D. Md. 1937). The principle upon
which such decisions rests is that the protection of a dealer's business opportunity is not
properly within the scope of antitrust protectior rather than upon whether the termi-
nation will have an anticompetitive effect.
°° 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), affd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
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other manufacturers' products. However, the court concluded that
those results in themselves did not make the exclusive dealership ar-
rangement condemnable." The court emphasized that the antitrust
laws did not protect the intrabrand competition between dealers but
rather protected only: the availability of the supply to the public of a
particular type of product; the existence of interbrand competitive
prices; and other competitive conditions in the interbrand market
generally." Therefore, under Schwing, the existence of an agreement
between a manufacturer and one dealer which destroys the business
of another dealer and thereby decreases intrabrand competition is not
violative of section 1.
By emphasizing form over substance, the courts have submitted
to the utilization by manufacturers of the "right to refuse to deal" so
as to permit manufacturers to structure their distribution networks in
such a manner that the anticompetitive effects of the automobile
manufacturing oligopoly can reach the retail level."" A method of in-
suring some competition in the prices and services offered to the con-
sumer in the automobile industry, if not in the interhrand market, is
to protect competition in the intrabrand market. To so insure competi-
tion at the retail level there must be a number of dealers who can ef-
fectively compete with one another. Such a result will not be obtained,
however, if there is only one retail dealer who is owned or controlled
by the manufacturer. Therefore, so long as a manufacturer can
support his decision to limit or eliminate independent dealers by ref-
erence to his "right to refuse to deal," viable competition in the au-
tomobile industry will be effectively foreclosed. Notwithstanding the
fact that the manufacturer's right to deal as he chooses has tradition-
ally received strong judicial support"° and has been favored by
commentators," an erosion of the almost automatic protection of that
right to deal is indicated by recent decisions." Such an erosion, and a
corresponding promotion of intrabrand competition, can best be illus-
trated by the expanding judicial awareness of the antitrust implica-
tions of vertical boycotts."
87 Id. at 903.
" Id. at 904.
" See id. at 903. See text at notes 79-88 supra.
"See cases cited at note 78 supra.
" See, e.g., Handler, Statement Before the Small Business Administration, 11
ANTITRUST BULL 417, 420-21, 428-29, 437 (1966)..
"See text at notes 94-108 infra.
" A vertical boycott exists when some members of a vertically structured distribu-
tion chain refuse or fail to deal with other members of the same chain, thereby enhanc-
ing the possibility that the members who continue to trade will do so in a controlled
and potentially anticompetitive manner. Discussion of the cases involving vertical
boycotts is relevant to an analysis of the lawfulness of the activities in Coleman which al-
legedly resulted in Coleman's elimination as a dealer in Chrysler automobiles. Vertical
boycotts, like the arrangement between Chrysler and its factory dealers, typically involve
an agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee that is based on a manufacturer's
decision with respect to his method of distribution. Furthermore, discussion of vertical
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For quite some time, horizontal boycotts established for the pur-
pose of eliminating competitors have been considered per se violations
of the antitrust laws. 94
 However, vertical boycotts with the same pur-
pose or effect have escaped liability." Two boycott arrangements
which have been condemned by the Supreme Court, while not purely
vertical, had vertical as well as horizontal elements." Therefore, while
these cases do not explicitly forbid anticompetitive vertical arrange-
ments, they can be read to imply such a prohibition. Such an implica-
tion can be viewed as indicating that while vertical boycotts have es-
caped liability in the past, they are not absolutely immune from the
sanctions of the antitrust laws.
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.," a retailer dealing in
the same product as Klor's induced the manufacturers of the product
to agree among themselves not sell to Klor's." While the Klor's
boycott was horizontal, it did have a vertical aspect insofar as a re-
tailer, through his inducement, was a party to the manufacturers' agree-
ment. Moreover, the retailer presumably still had access to the prod-
uct while Klor's did not; thus presenting another vertical aspect at the
level at which Klor's competed. Similarly, in United States v. General
Motors Corp.," certain of Chevrolet's dealers were, to the dissatisfac-
tion of other Chevrolet dealers, selling cars to discount houses which
disrupted the sales price of Chevrolets on the market.'" The dissatis-
fied dealers convinced General Motors to prevent such sales to the
discount houses.'°' Had General Motors been successful in preventing
the sales, the discount houses would have been excluded from the
market.' °2
In both Klor's and General Motors, the Court focused on the "ex-
clusion of traders" as the illegal conductm and not on the vertical or
horizontal character of the boycott."' Therefore, the Court implied
that the vertical-horizontal distinction is not as relevant to an assess-
boycotts is also relevant because they exemplify a practice and result, like the practices
in Coleman which resulted in the elimination of the Coleman dealership, which preclude
a dealer from being an effective competitor.
9 ' See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959).
93 See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-64 (1963).
" United States v. General Motois Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
97 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
"Id. at 213-16.
99
 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
i".rd. at 130-34.
'°' Id. at 133-36.
m2 /d. at 138.
'°' General Motors, 384 U.S. at 146 ("Exclusion of traders from the market by
means of combination or conspiracy is ... inconsistent with the free-market principles
embodied in the Sherman Act ... ."); Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213.
194 But see Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212; United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 372-73 (1967).
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ment of the competitive effects of certain conduct as the repercussions
on competition of the elimination of competing traders. Such a shift
in emphasis suggests that the focus should not be on whether the
manufacturer has merely exercised his absolute right to deal as he
pleases in a vertical arrangement, but on whether such an exercise has
had an anticompetitive effect.
Lower court decisions more explicitly reflect an extension of lia-
bility to situations which although minimally horizontal have more
substantial vertical elements than were present in the Supreme Court
cases. 108 For example, in Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, inc.,'
the First Circuit, relying on General Motors, condemned a purely verti-
cal agreement between Ford and one of its dealers to keep competing
Ford dealers from engaging in certain practices. 1 °' The court refused
to distinguish Ford from General Motors on the ground asserted by the
defendant that the latter case involved a horizontal rather than verti-
cal arrangement, stating "we find no controlling significance in the
fact that such a boycott takes its shape and strength from a series of
vertical agreements rather than from a single vertical-horizontal
agreernent." 118 Notwithstanding the fact that these lower court cases,
of which Ford is typical, involve in most instances at least a nominal
horizontal element, it is clear that that element is no longer as sub-
stantial a factor as it was in earlier cases. As the horizontal-vertical dis-
tinction becomes less important as a determinative factor, the doctrine
that a manfuacturer can deal as he pleases in a vertical context is
weakened. A logical corollary to this weakening is an increased con-
cern not for the form of the arrangement or a manufacturer's "right,"
but rather for the effects which such an arrangement might have on
competition in the marketplace. This concern can arguably be pro-
moted by placing restraints on a manufacturer's freedom to vertically
integrate. Such integration has the potential for vesting complete con-
trol in the manufacturer, thereby precluding competition between the
various entities established to distribute the manufacturer's goods.
The Third Circuit in Coleman made a further departure from
Schwing. The court acknowledged that a potential defense to a claim
that vertical integration violates section 1 could be grounded in the
theory that a manufacturer has a right to structure the method of dis-
tribution of his own product as he sees fit.'" In fact, the defendant in
'" See Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); Hub Auto Supply, Inc. v. Automatic Radio Mfg.
Co., 173 F. Supp. 396, 397 (D. Mass. 1959).
1 ° 6 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966).
1 ° 7 Id, at 877-78.
" 6 /(1. at 882-83.
1 ° 6 525 F.2d at 1347. The defendant also had raised this defense in the district
court, 376 F. Supp. 546, 554.55 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The district court rejected the defense
by stating, "[w]hile Chrysler may have an absolute right to terminate Coleman's Dealer-
ship, and not having done so, it then becomes a question of whether or not Coleman
can be driven out of business by an obvious predatory intent to maximize profits at the
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Coleman argued under the Schwing doctrine, that since Chrysler could
have terminated Coleman's franchise directly without violating section
1, it could do so indirectly by opening competing dealerships. It was
asserted that such dealerships could increase interbrand trade even
though an individual competitor might be injured."° Chrysler could
have'argued convincingly that evidence of an injury to a single com-
petitor under Schwing is not enough to find liability under section 1
since all competition affects the trade of individual competitors but
does not necessarily restrain trade."' However, the district court in
Coleman countered defendant's argument that the focus of the injury
to competition test should be upon injury to interbrand competition
by indicating that such argument did not take into account the doc-
trine advanced in later cases that restraints of intrabrand as well as
interbrand competition could serve as the basis for a section 1
claim." 2 Furthermore, beyond a bare assertion that interbrand com-
petition would prosper under its factory dealership programs,
Chrysler did not produce any evidence which would support that
claim." 3 Assuming that the automobile manufacturers' oligopolistic
structure barred effective price competition in the interbrand
market," 4 it is unlikely that Chrysler could have produced enough
evidence to counterbalance the reduction in intrabrand competi-
tion." 5 While Chrysler's own share of the market increased some-
what after the opening of factory dealerships, 11 ' the aggregate share
of the market controlled by the Big Three remained relatively un-
changed."' There was no evidence that Chrysler's increased mar-
ket penetration had any noticeable benefits for the consumer, such as
a decrease in prices due to competition between Chrysler, General
Motors, and Ford." 8 Furthermore, in response to a defense based on
a manufacturer's "right to deal," the court reasoned that the proposi-
tion was "open to question""8 and at the very least was qualified by
the condition "that a lawful end achieved by unlawful means is not
manufacturing level by minimizing losses at the retail level." Id. at 555 (emphasis
added). Thus, the district court also chose to subject Chrysler's potential "absolute
right" to a qualification that the right be exercised in a lawful manner.
10 Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 546, 554-55 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
1 " See Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 876, 885 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), affd, 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
" 9 376 F. Supp. 546, 555 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
"3 525 F.2d at 1347-48.
"'See text at notes 59-63 supra.
"5 It would also appear likely, in light of the manner in which the oligopoly op-
erates, that no firm in any "tight" oligopoly could ever produce such evidence.
" 9 See note 43 supra.
"7 1d.
"9 While Chrysler's increase in market penetration may have increased Ford's
and General Motors'concern and competitive response to the situation for a short time,
eventually prices would even out due to a continuation of interdependent decision mak-
ing. See Mueller, supra note 49, at 112-16.
" 9 525 F.2d at 1347.
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protected by the antitrust laws." 12 °
Support for the circuit court's reasoning can be found both in
the growing trend toward limiting the scope of a manufacturer's
discretion,'" and in the qualification to which such discretion has uni-
formly been subject; namely, that the exercise of a manufacturer's
freedom is not protected if it has the effect of either creating a
monopoly or otherwise violating the antitrust laws.' 22 Furthermore, in
light of the theory postulated above' 23 that there is little, if any, com-
petition at the factory level in the automobile industry, it can be ar-
gued that cases restricting the manufacturer's right in some circum-
stances will provide the legal tools necessary to protect one of the re-
maining possibilities for actual competition in that industry—
competition at the retail level.'"
In Coleman, the elimination of independent dealers would lessen
competition since as the number of independent dealers decreased
the consumer would be left with fewer Dodge dealers to choose from,
thereby reducing the incentive of the remaining Dodge dealers to
offer better prices or services.'" Furthermore, if the elimination of
independent dealers proceeded until all such dealers were gone, the
consumer would be left with only manufacturer-owned dealerships.
The anticompetitive nature of a market in which the manufacturer is
the only trader is obvious; if there are no intrabrand competitors,
clearly there will be no intrabrand competition.
The Coleman court noted two areas in which competition would
result from the existence of a number of independent traders.' 28 The
first area was that of competitive pricing. The court noted that each
manufacturer has a range of "price jurisdiction" within which he can
raise prices slightly above the prices set by a competitor and remain
competitive.'" Testimony was offered to show that the "price jurisdic-
tion" in Coleman was approximately $200 to $300 per vehicle and was
the result of various non-price factors—such as styling, engine per-
formance, transmission quality, dealer convenience and servicing—
which influence a consumer's decision to buy an automobile.'"
The court reasoned that as long as there were several dealerships with
different owners, they could compete within the range of "price juris-
diction" for the business of the consumers who wished to purchase a
certain brand of automobile. 12 " The court went on to state that "the
elimination of an independent dealer diminishes that competition,"
"° Id.
"'See text at notes 77-108 supra.
1 " See note 78 supra,
122 See text at notes 43-63 supra.
1 " See text at notes 77-108 supra.
125 See text at notes 126.135 infra.
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and that if "all independent dealerships were eliminated, Chrysler
could eliminate price competition within the full range of price
jurisdiction." 130 Therefore, the court concluded that the elimination
of the Coleman dealership had an anticompetitive effect.' 3 '
The second area in which the Coleman court found a lessening of
competition was in the service provided by automobile dealers. Noting
the existence of competition in the price of both parts and service and
in the quality of service which existed between dealers, the court
reasoned that if all independent dealers were eliminated such compe-
tition would be eliminated as well.' 32 The court conceded that
Coleman's testimony to the effect that he was proud of his
dealership's service was the only evidence concerning service. 133 How-
ever, it concluded that it was "common knowledge that quality of ser-
vice is vital to a successful automobile dealership." 134 The court,
therefore, implied that the motivation of making a profit and succeed-
ing as an automobile dealer would foster competition between dealers
in servicing.' 35 If all independent dealers were eliminated, the incen-
tive for service competition would also be eliminated since the con-
sumer would have no choice but to go to the remaining dealer.
As a result of the erosion of a manufacturer's right to structure
his distributive system as he sees fit, particularly in a vertical ar-
rangement, the courts have begun to exhibit a greater concern for
substance rather than form. In this context, the possible anticompeti-
tive effects of the alleged conduct are deemed to be more significant
than_ the issue of whether the manufacturer was merely exercising his
"right to refuse to deal" in a vertical form. As has been noted above,
effective competition does not exist at the manufacturer level in the
automobile industry,' 3° but the absence thereof is not presently a vio-
lation of the antitrust laws.' 37 Therefore, concern for substance must
be directed towards any conduct which might have an anticompetitive
effect in the only market in which actual competition can be found
and protected by the antitrust laws—the retail intrabrand market.
B. The Factors Relevant to Finding a Restraint of Trade in a Tendency
Towards Vertical Integration
1. Intracorporate Conspiracy






133 Thus, whether Coleman was successful in his efforts to compete was not as
relevant as the issue of whether there were various dealerships owned by different par-
ties who would find it necessary to compete in servicing in order to succeed in the mar-
ket.
13° See text at notes 43-63 supra.
137 See text at notes 64-68 supra.
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dealers combined and conspired to eliminate him as a competing
dealer.' 38 That two affiliated entities, such as Chrysler and a factory
dealership, can constitute discrete entities capable of combining in an
intracorporate conspiracy within the meaning of section 1 has been
firmly established by the Supreme Court.'" The Coleman court con-
cluded that the evidence was such that the jury could reasonably have
found that Chrysler combined and conspired with the managers of its
factory dealerships.'" The court based its conclusion on the following
evidence: (1) Chrysler provided loss and advertising subsidies to fac-
tory dealers; (2) Chrysler discriminated in favor of factory dealers in
the release of new automobiles; (3) Chrysler paid the salaries of key
managerial employees of factory dealers; and (4) the president of
Boulevard Dodge testified to the effect that Chrysler's regional man-
ager, after being informed of the president's concern for the losses
which his company was sustaining, had told him not to worry because
Chrysler was satisfied by making its profit at the factory level and in-
tended to "reduce the number of Dodge dealers in Allegheny County
from 16 to 11, under their new marketing program." 141 Although
such evidence could not serve as the basis for a showing of an explicit
agreement, this deficiency in the evidence was not fatal to a finding of
a Sherman Act conspiracy. 142 The conspiracy or agreement to restrain
trade required under the Sherman Act may be shown by circumstan-
tial evidence, such as the conduct of the parties, as well as by direct
evidence.'"
2. Evidence Necessary to Show an Implied Agreement
While finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict,
the court in Coleman did not provide any practical indicia for deter-
tae 525 F.2d at 1340.
"ll See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951) (conspiracy between an American company and its English and French sub-
sidiaries); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951)
(conspiracy between two subsidiaries of the same company); Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948) (conspiracy between parent company
and its wholly owned subsidiaries). In fact, in two cases involving § 1 claims against a
manufacturer and his distributors, the Supreme Court specifically affirmed its position
that an intracorporate conspiracy was a conspiracy within the meaning of § 1. See
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), where the
Supreme Court in finding a conspiracy between a corporation, its parent corporation,
and agents and officers of the corporations stated that since the defendants had
"availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations,
the fact of common ownership could not save them from any of the obligations that the
law imposes on separate entities." Id. at 141-42. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
14° 525 F.2d at 1345.
Ill Id. at 1344-45. The regional manager denied making the statements. Id. at
1345 n.9.
"'See Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336,
1343 (9th Cir. 1970); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 835 (1957).
"3 Coleman, 525 F.2d at 1345. 887
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mining whether an agreement to restrain trade exists in a particular
case. However, in England v. Chrysler Corp. ,144 a case similar to
Coleman, the Ninth Circuit did provide some guidance on the issue.
The plaintiff in England, an independent dealer, alleged that
Chrysler's deliberate over-emphasis on sales at the factory level,
through the unreasonable operation of its factory dealerships, created
intense pressure on plaintiff to compete at a level which could not be
profitable, leading to plaintiff's eventual demise.'"
The England court assumed the possibility of restraint without
finding liability. A finding of actual restraint was not made since the
evidence was not sufficient to support a conclusion that the manner in
which Chrysler operated the factory dealerships resulted from inten-
tional and unreasonable management rather than unintentional
mismanagement.'" Since the court reasoned that unintentional mis-
management was not condemnable, plaintiff would have to show that
the conduct was deliberate.' 47 The court went on, however, to state
that "deliberate" did not mean that there must be a specific intent to
produce the economic effect. Rather, deliberate was construed to
mean that the alleged conspirators agreed on the course of conduct
which created the result, as opposed to agreeing on the result itself.'"
With regard to such a definition of "deliberate," the England
court reasoned that if it could be inferred that Chrysler determined to
operate its factory dealerships irrespective of retail profit, the conduct
could be construed to be "deliberate."'" In this context, it was not
unreasonable for the Coleman jury to conclude that Chrysler's conduct
was deliberate and therefore constituted an agreement. The jury had
before it a statement, allegedly made by Chrysler's regional manager,
which indicated that Chrysler was not concerned with retail profits
because it would be satisfied with making profits at the factory level.
The evidence also tended to show that Chrysler discriminated in favor
of factory dealers in the release of new automobiles. Furthermore,
there was evidence to the effect that when plaintiff went out of busi-
ness Chrysler reduced its advertising expenditures for one of
Coleman's closest geographical factory dealer competitors.' 5 ° There-
fore, the jury could reasonably conclude that the alleged conspirators
agreed on the course of conduct and that Chrylser operated the fac-
tory dealerships without regard for profit at the retail level. Thus, the
necessary agreement could be found from these facts.
However, while it is possible to conclude that the requisite corn-
'A 4934.2d 269 (9th Cir.), cert. dented, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).




 Id. The Coleman court also distinguished between intent and effect by stating
that "(i)f the defendant's conduct has anticompetitive effects, unimpeachable motives
will not save it from condemnation." 525 F.2d at 1345 n.10.
"" 493 F.2d 269, 273-74 (9th Cir.), ern. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
isa 525 F.2d at 1344.
888
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
bination or conspiracy in fact existed and that the only workable
competition ' 51 in the automobile industry as it is presently organized
can occur in retail sales, there is little additional authority, beyond
that contained in the England dicta, enunciating the other factors rel-
evant to a determination of whether there has been a restraint of
trade in the intrabrand market. Since the England court only assumed
the possibility of the existence of an illegal restraint in the intrabrand
market of the type alleged by plaintiff, the court did not determine
the issue of whether such a restraint had actually occurred in that
case. Consequently, the England opinion does not demonstrate the
manner in which the facts in a particular case ought to be viewed in
order to resolve the question of whether a violative restraint has taken
place. Reference must therefore be made to other decisions for such a
demonstration.
3. The Factor of Restraint in the Intrabrand Market
Some appellate courts have addressed the issue of restraints in
an intrabrand context.'" However, to date, no federal appellate court
other than the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has considered
the possible restraint in the intrabrand market fostered by the elimi-
nation of independent dealers and a corresponding tendency towards
a vertically integrated distribution system.' 53 There are, however, two
district court opinions which shed light on the question.' 54 In Mi.
Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.,'" plaintiff was a Dodge dealer
whose franchise was terminated by Chrysler.' 56 The structure of the
market in which plaintiff competed was like that in Coleman insofar as
Chrysler had instituted the same kind of factory dealership plans.
Plaintiff offered evidence to show that the factory dealerships en-
gaged in price-cutting and massive advertising to the detriment of in-
151 Initially, it should be noted that when Chrysler in Coleman entered the market
through its factory dealers, it became a competitor of its independent dealers. Id. at
1346. On a theory of workable competition, a reduction in the number of competitors
would effect a reduction in the amount of competition. See G. STOCKING, WORKABLE
ComPrrrrtoN AND AvraftusT POLICY 243-45 (1961); Adelman, Effective Competition and
the Antitrust tows, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1302-04 (1948); Oligopoly in the Automobile in-
dustry, 4 ANTITRUST LAw & EcoN. REv. 53, 55 (Fall, 1970).
"See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (ter-
ritorial restrictions); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.
1975) (territorial restrictions); Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093
(3d Cir. 1972) (refusal to deal); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Li-
quors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) (refusal to
deal).
'SaColeman, 525 F.2d at 1346.
154 See Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974); Mt. Lebanon Motors,
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), red per curiam, 417 F.2d 623
(3d Cir. 1969).
"5 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), affd per curiam, 417 F.2d 623 (3d Cir.
1969).
155
 Id. at 455.
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dependent dealerships which could neither profitably advertise on
such a large scale nor accept profits as small as those of factory
dealers.'" Furthermore, plaintiff's evidence tended to show that
Chrysler provided loss subsidies and personnel to the factory
dealers. 1 S 8 In holding Chrysler's practices to be unlawful, the court
reasoned that "whatever evils may be shown to exist arise simply from
the fact that the factory is engaging in direct competition with its
customers." 156 The evil to which the court referred was the restraint
of trade engendered by the elimination of "competition by putting out
of business one dealer after another individually, [that is] by exclud-
ing competitors from any substantial market."'" The court concluded
that Chrysler's activities, which allowed its factory dealers to operate at
a less profitable level than independent dealers, were the result of
predatory practices"' and were a classical example of restraint of
trade. 162 Mt. Lebanon's unfavorable competitive position, the court
held, was unrelated to the competitive merits of plaintiff and the fac-
tory dealers. Rather, such unfavorable position was the result of an
adventitious advantage which resulted from Chrysler's ability to sus-
tain losses as a dealer at the retail level due to the profits it was able
to make at the factory level."3 Thus, the gist of the violation in the
Mt. Lebanon court's view was the elimination of intrabrand competitors
for reasons other than the natural play of consumer choice based
upon the relative competitive merits of the respective contestants in
the market.
Another case involving a situation similar to that in Coleman is
Rea v. Ford Motor Co. 164 While the district court in that case based
much of its decision with respect to the section 1 claim on extensive
quotations from Mt. Lebanon," 5 it did illuminate some additional fac-
tors pertinent to the present inquiry.'" The situation in Rea was strik-
ingly similar to that in Coleman. Ford, like Chrysler, had developed a
factory dealership plan.' 67 The evidence in Rea showed that factory
dealers, backed by the resources of Ford, spent two to three times as
' 57 Id. at 457.
' 58 Id.
166 Id.
166 Id. at 459.
161 Id. at 458-59.
1 " Id. at 459.
143 hi
1" 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 577 (3d
Cir.), cm. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974).
'"Id. at 869-71.
166 Significantly, Rea is more similar to Coleman than Mt. Lebanon insofar as Mt.
Lebanon contained a price-cutting element, 283 F. Supp. at 457, which was not present
in Rea and Coleman. Consequently, since the Rea court relied heavily on the Mt. Lebanon
opinion in reaching its conclusion, see 355 F. Supp. at 869-71, the absence or presence
of price-cutting in Coleman need not be determinative in finding a restraint of trade
under the theory advanced in Mt. Lebanon.
" 7
 355 F. Supp. at 867.
890
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
much on advertising as independent dealers.'" Furthermore, Ford
infused large sums of money into its factory dealerships enabling
them to secure better facilities than independent dealerships. 169 When
the manager of a factory dealership showed concern for the losses his
dealership was sustaining, he was informed that Ford did not care
how much he lost or spent as long as he moved a large number of
automobiles.'" Thus, Ford, like Chrysler, displayed a lack of concern
for profits at the retail level due to its ability to make a profit at the
factory level.
The court noted that such an attitude on the part of Ford was a
classic example of maximizing profits by subsidizing losses at the retail
level.'" Ford was still able to make a profit on each car sold and to
receive a tax deduction for any losses sustained by a subsidiary. The
court reasoned that Ford, by opening factory dealerships, was in
competition with its own independent dealers and that any course of
conduct Ford entered upon in combination with its factory dealers to
drive independent dealers out of business or to dominate the market
would constitute a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. 12 Since
plaintiff, an independent dealer, could not afford to spend as much
on advertising or operate at such an unprofitable level as the factory
dealers, the court concluded that the jury was justified in finding an
illegal restraint of trade insofar as Ford's practices placed plaintiff at a
substantial competitive disadvantage. Thus, the Rea court, like the Mt.
Lebanon court, established the gravamen of the offense as the utiliza-
tion of unfair competitive practices which resulted in the elimination
of a competitor from the market. That a similar restraint of trade oc-
curred in Coleman due to the elimination of a competitor as a result of
predatory practices rather than the interaction of natural competitive
conditions is obvious. Through factory dealerships, Chrysler, like the
manufacturer in both Mt. Lebanon and Rea, entered the market as a
competitor of one of its independent dealers.
Both Mt. Lebanon and Rea, as well as other cases, make it clear
that the existence of a competitive relationship affects the manner in
which a manufacturer can operate his business without incurring an-
titrust liability.'" That such a relationship can impose limitations on a
manufacturer is apparent in the reasoning employed in Industrial
Building Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Ccrrp. 174 In that case, a manufac-
turer of sealants decided to no longer use the plaintiff as a dealer but
to distribute his own products. To accomplish this end, the manufac-




in Id. at 867.
"3 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967); Indus-
trial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342-43 (9th Cir.
1970).
174 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970).
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turer created a situation in which the plaintiff could not effectively
and economically compete in the sale of any line of sealants.'" The
Ninth Circuit adopted plaintiff's contention that defendant manufac-
turer could not choose to become a competitor in distributing and
then employ unfair or unlawful means of competition with immu-
nity. 16 The court reasoned that
when the manufacturer enters the field and then removes a
distributor, the public is left with only the manufacturer in-
stead of the manufacturer and the independent distributor.
Accomplishment of this anticompetitive objective by a man-
ufacturer in a dominant market position by means of con-
spiracy and unfair tactics must surely be proscribed by the
antitrust laws.'"
Where, as in Coleman, the public is left with only an anticompetitive
oligopolistic manufacturer, the anticompetitive objective achieved by
the manufacturer has an even greater effect on the competitive op-
tions available to the consumer in the marketplace than the situation
in Industrial Building, where the possibility of effective interbrand
competition still existed.'"
Plaintiff in Coleman did not contend, nor did the court hold, that
Chrysler could not open factory dealerships in competition with Cole-
man. Rather, plaintiff's contention was directed at the particular
method by which Chrysler established and maintained factory dealer-
ships and at the anticompetitive effect which would necessarily flow
from the continuation of that method. Chrysler supplied its factory
dealerships with loss subsidies and advertising funds, enabling factory
dealers to operate out of bigger, more attractive showrooms and to
conduct more extensive advertising campaigns. Therefore, Coleman
was put at a competitive disadvantage since in order for him to have
such showrooms and advertising campaigns, the capital needed would
have to come from his own resources, thereby reducing the amount
of profits he could expect to make. That Coleman could be put at
such a competitive disadvantage would not in itself be a sufficient
basis for a section 1 claim.'" However, since the factory dealers' com-
petitive advantage was not the result of functional competitive
superiority but of an adventitious advantage, the plaintiffs claim
could be supported.'" Since Chrysler would make a profit on the
sales of automobiles irrespective of profits at the retail level, it could
afford to sustain losses at the retail level which independent dealers
could not afford. Thus, through the use of a predatory practice—an
'" Id. at 1342.
'" Id. at 1342-43.
' 17 1d.
1 " Id. at 1337, 1343.
1 T 0 See text at notes 144-151, 155-178 supra.
' 80 See text at notes 155-178.
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adventitious advantage—Chrysler could impair independent dealer-
ships to the point where they could no longer operate profitably. Such
a situation would increase the likelihood of the elimination of com-
petitors and correspondingly decrease competition. Although the
Coleman court did not set forth the ensuing effect of Chrysler's con-
duct in detail, it did conclude that "Chrysler's actions were unfairly
competitive and that their effect was to force plaintiff out of
business."'"
Therefore, practices such as those employed by Chrysler in
Coleman which restrain trade in the intrabrand market can legitimately
be subjected to Sherman Act liability. That such practices can be so
subjected is particularly justifiable and commendable since the only
free competition which the consumer can hope for in the purchase of
an automobile is that which exists in the intrabrand retail market.
Furthermore, suits such as Coleman have the potential to limit the Big
Three automobile manufacturers' ability to vertically integrate to the
extent that the anticompetitive atmosphere of the interbrand market
is recreated in the intrabrand market. 182
CONCLUSION
Due to high concentration and entry barriers, the automobile
industry displays the characteristics of an oligopoly which leads to an-
ticompetitive behavior at the manufacturer level. However, since this
behavior is the result of interdependent rather than collusive decisions
or a single firm monopoly, the anticompetitive effects of such be-
havior are outside the present scope of the antitrust laws. Conse-
quently, the only competition which can be protected by the antitrust
laws in the industry occurs at the retail level.
Recent developments in antitrust law increase the potential for
insuring competitive conditions in the automobile industry as they
exist in the intrabrand market. A developing trend away from a
manufacturer's "right to refuse to deal," particularly in a vertical ar-
rangement, displays an increasing judicial awareness of the anticom-
petitive effects of certain types of manufacturer conduct rather than
the form which such conduct takes. For instance, if the anticompeti-
tive effects are manifest in the intra rather than interbrand market,
'"' 525 17.2d at 1345.
' 52 Since the result in Coleman is laudable because it can deter this tendency to-
ward reduced competition in the intrabrand market, it rests in part on the assumption
that competition in the interbrand market is negligible or nonexistent. Therefore, any
specific allegation that Chrysler's conduct in Coleman had the effect of promoting com-
petition in the interbrand market must be investigated. As noted above, the evidence
failed to show any such procompetitive effect of Chrysler's conduct. Sec text at notes
113-118 supra. Since the automobile industry displays anticompetitive oligopolistic be-
havior in general, it is likely that when a manufacturer begins to trade at the retail level
its anticompetitive nature will follow it. Consequently, the manufacturer should have
the burden of proving that a reduction in intrabrand competition was offset by an in-
crease in interbrand competition.
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the manufacturer is no longer automatically protected from liability
pursuant to his "right to refuse to deal." Rather, cases show that the
substantive effect of certain manufacturer decisions, including the de-
cision to vertically integrate his distribution system, ought to be ex-
amined to determine the anticompetitive effects.
As long as a number of independent retail dealers survive, com-
petition can continue in the absence of anticompetitive agreements be-
tween the dealers themselves. However, as the number of dealers is
reduced, competition will most likely be reduced as well. And if all
independent dealers are eliminated, leaving only the manufacturer at
the retail level, the anticompetitive behavior of the interbrand au-
tomobile market can be transferred to the intrabrand market. Cases
like Coleman, however, which recognize the existence and importance
of intrabrand competition can deter this transfer by prohibiting pred-
atory practices which restrain trade in that market. Therefore, a
tendency towards vertical integration in the distribution of au-
tomobiles ought to be carefully scrutinized to determine the effect
which such integration might have upon trade and the manner in
which such integration was accomplished. Otherwise the antitrust laws
may be powerless to deter any "acceleration of the trend towards ver-
tical integration of the distribution process" 83 in an industry in which
competition would certainly suffer from such an acceleration.
LYNNE E. LARKIN
'" 3 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
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